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In Search of the History of Tajikistan

What Are Tajik and Uzbek Historians Arguing About?

The author examines divergent versions of the history of the Tajiks and of Tajik–Uzbek relations in the works of Tajik and Uzbek historians.

The newly independent states invariably use history as one of the main ideological instruments of nation and state building. Similar processes occurred during the establishment of political regimes in Central and Eastern Europe after World War I, even in such relatively democratic states as Czechoslovakia.1 An example from that period that is closer to Central Asia is Turkey, with its official historiography of Turanism followed by the Turkish nationalism of Ataturk.2 New historical theories also arise in the course of decolonization, strengthening emerging states and regimes in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Often, of course, historical theories current in a given country have overlapped with the history of neighboring states. Various approaches to the perception of history have not only given rise to scholarly debates but also become a factor in interstate relations.
Contemporary Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are the territories with the strongest historical links in Central Asia. Since the acquisition of independence they have been marked by similar features of state and nation building. The establishment of ethnonational republics after the disintegration of the Soviet Union led, it seems to me, to the formation of hypertrophied nationalist ideologies that in the case of Tajiks and Uzbeks quite logically contradict and confront one another. The Soviet school of historiography, by contrast, supported the search for the historical roots of this or that nation exclusively in a particular soviet socialist republic—not on the territory of other, neighboring republics.\(^3\)

Contemporary Tajik historians react quite negatively to attacks by Uzbek historians or “pseudohistorians” (and vice versa). These reactions reveal the basic principles of the historical ideology of present-day Tajikistan, which in touching on the history of neighboring Uzbekistan generate a multitude of controversial scholarly issues. Due to the dependence of local scholarship on the state—or, more precisely, on state ideology—disputes between Uzbek and Tajik scholars become factors influencing interstate relations, as much as national interests and leaders’ personal traits.

In the present article, I would like to focus primarily on the Tajik historical literature and its intrinsic myths. Among the historical propositions advanced by the ethnonational ideologies characteristic of Central Asia, three areas of “scientific inquiry” predominated as a nation and state were established. The first is the search for the most remote past of a given nation in and beyond the current territory of the corresponding state. The second area describes the “Golden Age” of the nation in Central Asia or the Near East, not infrequently dated to the Middle Ages or the early modern period—that is, the era of the rise and fall of great empires. Finally, the third area encompasses the establishment of contemporary statehood. Let us examine how these three areas manifest themselves in Tajikistan and how they are perceived by historians in neighboring Uzbekistan.

**The Historical Homeland of the Tajiks**

The record of the first appearance of a particular people (ethnic group) in a given geographical space is an important element in the history of that people. In the Tajik case, there is the myth of a “historical Tajikistan” that encompasses significant regions of contemporary Central Asia, Iran, and Afghanistan.\(^4\) This “historical Tajikistan,” in the opinion of certain Tajik authors, has existed for at least twenty-five hundred years and was created by the Achaemenids [first Persian empire—Trans.].\(^5\) Of even more ancient origin, according to some authors, was the Aryan civilization in the territory of so-called Ariana, now
reckoned to be about eight thousand years old. In terms of antiquity, this date currently outdoes all the civilizations of Central Asia. Even Turkmen ideologues have managed to push back the sources of their civilization to only six thousand years. This creates the first topic of argument between Uzbek and Tajik historians and ideologues.

Citing nineteenth-century Russian authors, Uzbek historians try to constrict the zone of “traditional” Tajik habitation, confining it to the mountainous regions of the Pamir range. At the same time, they try to debunk the “Aryan myth,” which, in their opinion, has nothing to do with the Tajiks. Thus, Academician Akhmadali Askarov argues that the Aryan peoples who lived a settled life in Central Asia were foreigners who arrived in the region in the second millennium BCE. It follows from his article that these Aryan tribes were probably Turks who led a nomadic way of life. According to this theory, the zone of settlement of Turkic/Aryan tribes stretched from the Danube to Siberia and from the Urals to the southern part of Central Asia, while the empire of the Achaemenids arose in connection with the southward migration of Turkic/Aryan tribes. According to another theory proposed by Uzbek historians, the forebears of the Tajiks came to Central Asia from western Iran as late as the seventh and eighth centuries CE, in the train of the region’s Arab conquerors. Part of their mission was to control the local Iranian-speaking population, the Sogdians. Thus, ties between Iranian-speaking groups—the indigenous peoples of Central Asia and newly arrived peoples—are denied, and the Tajiks are assigned to the second group.

The main opponent of Askarov’s ideas in Tajikistan has been Rakhim Masov, director of the Institute of History of the Tajik Academy of Sciences. He has tried to expose the arguments in Askarov’s article and to demonstrate with the aid of traditional and new sources the correctness of the established views on the Aryan problem—that is, that the Aryans were the forebears of Iranians, Tajiks, and other Indo-Iranian groups. Here Masov proceeds from an anthropological difference between the Aryans and the Turks, pointing out the “lower” culture of the Turks by comparison with the Aryans. This line of argument leads Masov to a racist understanding of culture and to its division into “higher” and “lower.”

The voluminous monograph of Ibragim Umarzoda, History of Aryan Civilization [Istoriia tsivilizatsii arittsev], provides an example of an attempt to provide scientific support for the thesis that the contemporary Tajiks derive from the Aryans. Umarzoda presents the Aryans as the founders of European civilization and indicates that Europe was settled exclusively by Aryan tribes. As an interesting example of the impact of the Aryans on Europe, Umarzoda cites the data of certain European scholars concerning the influence of ancient Persian on the Finnish language. Besides settling Europe, the Aryans (and
the Turanians as their offshoot), in his interpretation, founded the Babylonian empire and created Zoroastrianism and other examples of civilization.14

As I have already noted, some Uzbek historians consider that the formation of Tajik society took place mostly in the Pamir Mountains and the Hindu Kush. Although other Uzbek authors acknowledge that the Tajiks originated in the Middle Persian empire of the Sassanids, they, too, deny any Tajik contribution to the history and culture of medieval Central Asia. In particular, the Uzbek professor Goga Khidoiatov, in comments on his The Downfall of the Samanids [Krushenie Samanidov], locates the region of habitation of the people who call themselves Aryans in the valleys of the contemporary Hindu Kush. British researchers confirmed this fact in the nineteenth century, and the author of the aforementioned work himself studied these tribes during his stay in northern Pakistan.15 In similar fashion, Khidoiatov tries to dispel the myth of the so-called “valley Tajiks.” In his opinion, no such people existed; their place was occupied by the so-called Eroni.16 Indeed, he finds support for this supposition in the self-identification of some Iranian-speaking residents of Bukhara and Samarkand with the “Eroni.”17 At the same time, the Uzbek author describes the inhabitants of northern Tajikistan—the present-day Sughd oblast—as “prosperous, self-satisfied, self-confident, imitating the Iranians in everything, conceited, boastful, speaking Farsi, dreaming of Tehran, fawning on the Iranians.”18 In other words, he uses a logic that rigidly counterposes “good” Uzbeks to “bad” Tajiks.

For their part, in direct contrast, Tajik historians idealize their own people’s special qualities, stressing and extolling the Tajiks’ love of peace: they “have waged war on no one, subjected no one to violence and cruelty.”19 Citing classical scholars of Central Asia, they declare that the Tajiks were indigenous to the region, while the Uzbeks merely adopted the Tajik lifestyle and culture.20 In this context they emphasize that in the nineteenth century the term “Tajik” was routinely used to identify peoples living in Central Asia.21

Nevertheless, most Uzbek historians do recognize the presence in Central Asia, alongside Uzbek groups, of Iranian or Iranian-speaking groups. Askarov holds that the ethnogenesis of the Uzbek people involved a fusion of Turkic and Iranian-speaking peoples, during which the latter adopted Turkic speech from the former.22 Akhmedov revises this idea and manages to find the first traces of the Uzbeks in antiquity, citing such authors as Pliny and Ptolemy. Other layers of the ethnogenesis of the Uzbeks are assigned to the seventh and eighth centuries CE and to the later eras of the Karakhanids and Seljukids. According to this view, the fusion of Turkic with non-Turkic—Sogdian or Khorezmian—peoples lay at the heart of the proto-Uzbek ethnic community. This approach makes it possible to regard such figures as Ibn Sina, Al-Khorezmi, and Al-Farghani as Uzbeks.23 Uzbek historians criticize the “ethnic
exclusivity of the Aryans,” inserting the Uzbeks into the Aryan context with the aid of archeological sources that in their opinion confirm the Turkic origin of the Aryan tribes. On the Tajik side, a typical reaction to this line comes from Masov, who refers to the Uzbeks as a “conglomerate of Turko-Mongol tribes and the indigenous population of the agrarian oases.”

As is clear from the above, the myth of Aryan civilization has become a key element in the historical ideology of the Tajik regime and a key factor in its confrontation with neighboring Uzbekistan. Relying on the classics of Russian and Soviet Oriental studies, Tajik historians—and, in their wake, ideologues—defined the Tajiks as the sole legitimate heirs of Aryan civilization in Central Asia. This claim was highlighted, in particular, when the republic observed the “Year of Aryan Civilization” with great pomp and ceremony in 2006. Tajik historical scholarship shapes the ideological image of the high culture of the Aryans (Tajiks) in contrast to the backward nomadic culture of the Turks (Uzbeks).

The Samanids, or Medieval Tajikistan

Like the state of Amir Timur [Tamerlane—Trans.] for medieval Uzbeks, the most outstanding era for medieval Tajiks was that of the Samanid state. The figure of Ismoil Somoni, as the forebear of contemporary Tajiks, already appears in the work of Sadriddin Aini and the best-known Tajik historian, Bobodzhon Gafurov. It is of interest that late Soviet and early post-Soviet textbooks do not distinguish the Samanids in any way from the general background of rulers of the feudal age. In contrast, in current Tajik historiography the idealized image of Somoni clearly lays claim to the role of “leader of the contemporary Tajiks.”

According to the Tajik view of history, one of the most important factors in the ethnogenesis of the Tajiks during the Samanid era was the completion of the formation of the Tajik nation. As Academician Nugmon Negmatov writes, the era of the Samanids was a continuation of the tochik ekhio (Tajik revival) that had begun under the Sassanids. It found expression in world achievements in science (Ibn Sina, Al-Beruni) and literature (Firdausi). Here it is appropriate to mention that Academician Vasili Barthold had already pointed out that it was during the Samanid era that Tajik displaced the Sogdian language. At the end of the Soviet period, Academician Mukhammadzhon Shukurov proposed the theory of “Great Khorasan” (Khurosoni buzurg), which glorified the single space stretching from northeastern Iran to present-day Tajikistan—a space united under the Samanids. According to Shukurov, this Khorasan identity is what divides present-day Tajiks from Iranians.

Tajik historians extol the Samanid state as the “high point of Islamic civilization.” The empire of the Samanids, they assert, was the source of all the
cultural acquisitions of early modern Europe. In addition, in its time this state was regarded as the strongest on earth. In contemporary Tajik historiography, the empire of the Samanids appears also as a model of governance—as an effective, well-ordered, and simple state structure. Thus, the destruction of the Samanid state by the “Turko-Mongols” meant the destruction of the most advanced culture of Turanian (Aryan) civilization.

As many observers have noted, the celebrations to mark the eleven-hundredth anniversary of the Samanid era, conducted in 1999 under the aegis of the United Nations, were the ideological embodiment of this cult in contemporary Tajikistan. A monument to Ismoil Somoni was erected in the center of Dushanbe; urban folklore refers to it as an icon of Emomali Rakhmonov. Tajikistan’s highest mountain (the former Peak of Communism) was renamed in honor of Somoni, as were the central streets of many Tajik cities and the contemporary Tajik currency. The Tajik cult of Ismoil Somoni and his empire mirrors and confronts in a natural manner the cult of Amir Timur in neighboring Uzbekistan: the celebrations in Tajikistan in 1999 to mark the 1,100th anniversary of the Samanids were a reaction to the commemoration of Timur’s 660th anniversary in Uzbekistan in 1996.

On the whole, it is clear that Tajik historians exaggerate the role and significance of the Samanid state, which they present as virtually a bulwark of enlightenment in Europe and the Muslim world in the Middle Ages. Moreover, the national leader himself propagates the idea of Samanid superiority. Indeed, he provided the first impetus toward the glorification of this dynasty. He then allowed his court ideologues and official historians to develop the idea of its hypertrophied cultural and historical importance. By no means do I seek to belittle the great cultural legacy of the Samanid empire. This approach of the Tajik historians (to be specific, Ibragim Umarzoda), however, clearly downplays the achievements of other parts of the Muslim world.

Naturally, such attitudes could not fail to provoke a response from Uzbek historians. Here it is worth paying special attention to the aforementioned Professor Khidoiatov’s The Downfall of the Samanids. Here, the basic thesis, which permeates the book, undercuts the political grandeur and cultural influence of the Samanid empire. Khidoiatov points out that the Samanids were merely satraps of the caliph in Baghdad. The Uzbek author reproaches the Tajiks for the tendency to artificially construct their own history, which in his opinion cannot be properly reconstructed simply because the available sources are inadequate. On the whole, he, like his Tajik colleagues, exaggerates—but in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, there are Uzbek specialists who adhere to milder positions. For example, Academician Askarov declares that the Tajiks did indeed emerge as an ethnic community at the time of the Samanid empire. Askarov, however, considers the Tajiks no more than an Iranianized
segment of the Turkic peoples that emerged during the fusion of Turks and Iranians in Central Asia in the sixth and seventh centuries CE.44

The Establishment of an Independent Tajikistan

The question of the creation in 1929 of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR)—or, more precisely, its separation from the Uzbek SSR—remains one of the most serious bones of contention for Uzbek and Tajik historians. The demarcation of borders along ethnic lines always leaves many reasons for dissatisfaction on one side or the other. The problem is that prior to the moment of demarcation the distinction between the terms “Uzbek” and “Tajik” was perceived not as a matter of “either–or” but rather as one of “both–and.” This was especially the case given the significant number of so-called Sarts* living in the region. Moreover, this term was interpreted by the local peoples and by outside researchers in a rather diffuse manner: in different contexts “Sarts” might refer either to people now considered Tajiks or to people now considered Uzbeks.45

After the formation of the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) within the Uzbek SSR, it became necessary to abolish the identifier “Sart” and delimit the identities “Tajik” and “Uzbek” without any kind of intermediate category. The “both–and” principle gave way to the “either–or” principle. But the ethnic, religious, and cultural mixture of the aforementioned territories made it impossible to establish clear-cut ethnic borders for the new administrative units. The consequences of this fact are still making themselves known.

In the early 1990s, the Tajik side advanced territorial claims on “age-old Tajik lands”—in particular, Bukhara, Samarkand, and the adjoining areas.46 A group of Tajik historians headed by Rakhim Masov cite evidence of violation of the rights of the Tajik people by the pan-Turkic elite in the Bukharan People’s [Soviet] Republic and later in the Uzbek SSR. Masov himself argues that Tajiks were “pushed out” of the cultural centers into the mountainous areas and the “assimilation” of those Tajiks who underwent Uzbekization in the 1920s.47 According to the logic of this group, the ethnoterritorial delimitation of Central Asia should have involved the creation of an Uzbek ASSR within a Tajik SSR rather than the reverse.48

If we accept the framework of a “Greater Tajikistan” (the fairly neutral term used by Sergei Abashin)49 or “historical Tajikistan” (the term used by

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*“Sart” is an old name for a “townsperson” or “settler,” distinguishing residents of Silk Road settlements from nomads and traveling merchants regardless of ethnicity or religion.—Ed.
Nugmon Negmatov, with a clear underlying ideological rationale), then its territory would have to encompass the entire zone of habitation of the Tajiks. That is, it would have to stretch from Iranian Khorasan and northern Afghanistan, through present-day Tajikistan and other countries of Central Asia, and even China.* Negmatov makes active use of the term “little contemporary Tajikistan”; this expression is designed to register the clear harm inflicted on the Tajik people when their current state was established. As Abashin notes, the monument to Somoni on the central square of Dushanbe provides symbolic testimony to this frustration with its map of “Greater Tajikistan,” spanning the listed regions, embedded in its foundation. Rakhim Masov accuses the so-called pan-Turkists of insulting the Tajiks with such epithets as “backward,” “ignorant,” and “savage.” The pan-Turkists, according to several Tajik historians, deliberately deny the existence of the Tajik people, which they regard as an “Iranianized Turkic faction.”

The group of scholars gathered around Masov deride as “traitors” those Tajiks whose passports show their ethnic affiliation as “Uzbek.” Such motifs occur, for instance, in their publications about the establishment of Soviet Tajikistan in the 1920s, where they brand as Tajik traitors the former jadids—in particular, Faizulla Khodzhaev and Abdu Kadyr Mukhitdinov—as well as Chinor Imamov, the Tajik delegate to the Territorial Commission of the Central Asian Bureau. These Tajik historians argue that in 1924 these “Uzbekified Tajiks” and supporters of pan-Turkism and later of “pan-Uzbekism” prevented the Tajiks from properly discussing questions of the self-determination of Tajikistan during the period of territorial delimitation. As Masov writes, “during our contemporary history we were deprived, with the aid of our own Turkicized Tajik careerists, of our age-old territory and cultural centers.” This historian also exposes many present-day Tajikized Uzbeks who “harm” the interests of the Tajik language in Uzbekistan.

More moderate Tajik historians point out that despite the many negative consequences of the borders, the allocation of a smaller territory for the Tajik ASSR (later SSR) nonetheless had its positive aspects. Among other things, it curtailed Turko-Mongol attempts to assimilate Tajiks, drew Tajiks into political activity, and facilitated the separation of politics from religion. In my opinion, the mere creation of such a territorial unit made a greater contribution to state building than the entire ideology of the Samanid empire. Some authors from Tajikistan, by the way, agree with me.

Uzbek historians, for their part, connect Soviet and post-Soviet Tajikistan with the aforementioned “mountain” Tajiks, who allegedly managed to gain

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*About forty thousand Tajiks live in Xinjiang.—Ed.
the upper hand over the “valley” Tajiks. These “mountain” Tajiks were the ones who manifested all the “bad” traits traditionally (according to Uzbek historians) characteristic of this group: an inclination to use drugs, a willingness to kill, and so on. 60 Contemporary Uzbek ideology in general tries not to acknowledge the presence of Tajiks (or other ethnic communities) as independent groups within Uzbekistan. According to the official doctrine, Tajiks are part of a single—Uzbek—people that speaks two languages. 61 Uzbeks understand “Sart” to apply to the settled population, primarily Turkic- or Iranian-speaking Uzbeks.

The Uzbeks also do all they can to emphasize the “complete support given to the Tajik ASSR by the more developed Uzbek SSR.” 62 The transfer of “Uzbek lands”—Leninabad (now Sughd) oblast—is likewise interpreted as a “gift” to Tajikistan, although in reply the Tajiks cite figures showing the initial predominance of Tajik-speaking people in this area. President Rakhmonov and his ideologues, upholding the autonomy [samobytnost’] of the Tajik past, appear to many Uzbek historians as racists armed with an ideology of racial supremacy and intent on seizing foreign lands—in particular, Samarkand and Bukhara. 63

In studying the question of borders in Central Asia and the divergent Tajik and Uzbek perceptions of their creation, the Russian ethnographer Sergei Abashin notes that the Tajik leadership confines the “protection” it extends to the Tajik population outside the borders of Tajikistan to Bukhara and Samarkand. This discourse ignores the presence of Tajik diasporas elsewhere in Central Asia, including, for example, the Ferghana Valley—not to mention Afghanistan. 64 This circumstance, indeed, lends Tajik nationalism a clearly anti-Uzbek coloration.

Conclusion

As Uzbekistan and Tajikistan develop a stronger sense of their own independence, each country is establishing a view of its own history, which is then inserted into the state ideology. Moreover, because the historical paths of the two states overlap, they interpret the same historical events, from a nationalist perspective, in diametrically opposite ways. As a result, the historiography of Central Asia is dominated by something in the nature of a “zero-sum game”: positive features in one people end up as negative features in the other. The position of the many historians who adhere to the thesis of an organic and inextricable Irano-Turkic—and, correspondingly, Tajik-Uzbek—connection hardly reaches the average “consumer of ideology.” 65

It is not surprising that the Tajik side should be more willing to develop the theme of Uzbek-Tajik relations in the history of reciprocal ties and contacts. Historians from Tajikistan, by virtue of the dominant intellectual paradigm
in that country, are compelled constantly to attack their Uzbek colleagues. By contrast, Uzbek historiography, taken as a whole, prefers other themes—in particular, the relationship between the Uzbek SSR and Russia or the situation of Uzbeks in Central Asia and in the Soviet Union. It touches on the theme of connections between Uzbeks and Tajiks mainly in response to assertions and declarations from the Tajik side.

Unfortunately, the scholarly debates that I have described and the stereotypes used in them have already found reflection in the ideologies of the respective political regimes and in the educational system in both countries. Certain politicians, with court historians and ideologues following in their wake, are trying to divide the two most closely related peoples of Central Asia. We can be sure that over the course of time the introduction of such ideological schemas, the curtailment of mutual knowledge, and a basic lack of reciprocal contacts will prepare the ground for estranging Uzbeks and Tajiks from one another at the level of everyday life.

Notes


13. Ibid., p. 78.


16. Ibid.

17. Nowadays, however, many Tajiks [in Uzbekistan—Trans.] use the identifier “Eroni” to avoid unnecessary problems with the Uzbek authorities. Most of these people consider themselves Tajiks, although the internal passports of many of them indicate that they are Uzbeks (interviews by the author in Bukhara in August 1999 and November 2008).


21. See, for example, the brief descriptions of the Bukhara emirate and of the Kokand and Khiva khanates by a Hungarian traveler: Armin Vamberi, Puteshestvie po Srednei Azii (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 2003), pp. 267, 273–74.


23. Akhmedov, “Vozvrashchhaias’.”


27. The phonetics of the literary language—among both Tajiks and Uzbeks—has a tendency toward retention of the unstressed o [okan’e: in standard Russian speech an unstressed o is pronounced a—Trans.], while in the Russophone tradition (especially in scholarly literature) the established practice is to write unstressed o as a. For this reason, I write personal names with o (thus: Ismoil Somoni) as this is closer to the language of the original, but at the same time I use terms with a that are established in scholarly usage, such as “Samanids” (Samanidy) and the “Samanid state” (Samanidskoe gosudarstvo).—Ed. [of Neprikosnovennyi zapas]


29. B. Gafurov, Ta’rikhi mukhtasari khalki tochik (Stalinabad, 1947).


34. V.V. Bartold [Barthold], “Istoriia Turkestan,” in his Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 121.

35. M. Shukurov, Khuroson ast in cho (Dushanbe, 1997).


38. Ibid., p. 168.

39. E. Rakmonov, “Privetstvie E.Sh. Rakmonova, prezidenta Respubliki Tadzhikistan,” in Vklad epokhi Samanidov, p. 10. The same characterization appears in Gafurov; this author, however, notes that a well-ordered bureaucracy does not in itself constitute evidence of the effective centralization of a state (Gafurov, Tadzhiki, p. 52).

40. Umarzoda, Istoriia tsivilizatsii aritsev, p. 130.

41. Ibid., p. 164.


44. Askarov, “Ariiskaia problema.”


47. R. Masov, Tadzhiki: vytesnenie i assimiliatsiia (Dushanbe: Irfon, 2003).


50. Negmatov, Tadzhiki, p. 23.


52. R. Masov, “‘Nasledie’ mangytskoi vlasti, ili Pochemu akademik Masov ne soglasen s akademikom Shukurovym” [manuscript] (Dushanbe, 2002), pp. 3–4.


54. Ibid., pp. 356–57, 368.

55. Ibid., pp. 365–66.

60. Khidoiatov, “Vot tak.”
63. Khidoiatov, “Vot tak.”